

Algebraic semantics for interpretability logics

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Logic and Applications 2025



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Introduction

Algebraic semantics (for normal modal logics):

- boolean algebras with additional operators,
- robustly complete.

Interpretability logics:

- extension of provability logic **GL**,
- interpreted on Kripke-like frames called Veltman frames.

Goals of this talk:

- define algebras for interpretability logics,
- check the similarity between the properties of algebras for modal and interpretability logics.

Boolean algebras with operators

- boolean algebra with operators (BAO): a boolean algebra together with an operator $f_{\Box}$ (or $f_{\Diamond}$), satisfying some conditions,
- every Kripke frame is a BAO,
- modal logic **K** is sound and complete with respect to the class of all BAOs,
- every normal modal logic is sound and complete with respect to some class of BAOs.

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Logic **IL**

Alphabet of logic **IL** is the union of the following sets:

- a countable set $\text{Prop} = \{p_0, p_1, p_2, \dots\}$, of propositional variables,
- a set $\{\perp\}$,
- a set $\{\rightarrow\}$,
- a set $\{\triangleright\}$ and
- a set $\{(,)\}$.

A formula of **IL** is given by the following:

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \mid \varphi \triangleright \varphi,$$

where $p \in \text{Prop}$.

Other symbols

We define $\neg$, $\wedge$, $\vee$, $\leftrightarrow$, $\top$, $\Box$ i $\Diamond$ as follows:

- $\neg\varphi := \varphi \rightarrow \perp$,
- $\varphi \wedge \psi := \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi)$,
- $\varphi \vee \psi := \neg\varphi \rightarrow \psi$,
- $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi := (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$,
- $\top := \neg\perp$,
- $\Box\varphi := (\neg\varphi) \triangleright \perp$ and
- $\Diamond\varphi := \neg\Box\neg\varphi$.

System **IL**

System **IL** contains all propositional tautologies and all instantiations of the following:

- L1 $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi),$
- L2 $\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi,$
- L3 $\Box(\Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \Box\varphi,$
- J1 $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \triangleright \psi),$
- J2 $((\varphi \triangleright \psi) \wedge (\psi \triangleright \chi)) \rightarrow (\varphi \triangleright \chi),$
- J3 $((\varphi \triangleright \chi) \wedge (\psi \triangleright \chi)) \rightarrow ((\varphi \vee \psi) \triangleright \chi),$
- J4 $(\varphi \triangleright \psi) \rightarrow (\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\psi),$
- J5 $(\Diamond\varphi \triangleright \varphi).$

Rules of inference are:

- modus ponens: from $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ and φ derive ψ ,
- necessitation: from φ derive $\Box\varphi$.

Proof

A *proof* of a formula φ in **IL** is a finite sequence of formulae such that φ is the final formula in the sequence and every formula in the sequence is

- a tautology,
- and instantiation of an axiom schema of **IL**,
- derived by a rule of inference from some of the previous formulas.

If there exists a proof of φ , we refer to φ as *provable* in **IL** or a *theorem* of **IL** and denote it as $\vdash \varphi$.

Derivation

A *derivation* of a formula φ from a set Γ in **IL** is a finite sequence of formulae such that φ is the final formula in the sequence and every formula in the sequence is

- theorem of **IL**,
- an element of Γ ,
- derived by modus ponens from some of the previous formulas.

If such a derivation exists, we refer to φ as *derivable* from Γ in **IL** and denote it as $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathbf{IL}} \varphi$.

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Veltman Semantics

Definition

A *Veltman frame* $\mathfrak{F}$ is a triple $(W, R, \{S_w : w \in W\})$, where W is a non-empty set, R transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on W and $\{S_w : w \in W\}$ a collection of binary relations on $R[w]$, where, for all $w \in W$, S_w is a reflexive and transitive and the restriction of R onto $R[w]$ is contained in S_w .

Definition

A *Veltman model* is a pair $\mathfrak{M} = (\mathfrak{F}, V)$, where $\mathfrak{F}$ is a Veltman frame and $V : \text{Prop} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$ is a *valuation* function.

Veltman Semantics

Valuation indexes a *forcing* relation $\Vdash$, in the following way:

$$\begin{aligned}
 w \Vdash p & \iff w \in V(p), \\
 w \Vdash \perp & \text{ for no } w \in W, \\
 w \Vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi & \iff w \not\Vdash \varphi \text{ or } w \Vdash \psi, \\
 w \Vdash \Box \varphi & \iff \forall v (wRv \Rightarrow v \Vdash \varphi), \\
 w \Vdash \varphi \triangleright \psi & \iff \forall u (wRu \ \& \ u \Vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \exists v (uS_w v \ \& \ v \Vdash \psi)).
 \end{aligned}$$

We also write $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$, if we want to specify the model $\mathfrak{M}$. If for all $w \in W$ in a model $\mathfrak{M}$, $w \Vdash \varphi$ holds, we write $\mathfrak{M} \Vdash \varphi$.

Forcing relation extends the valuation function to a set of all formulae:

$$V(\varphi) = \{w \in W : w \Vdash \varphi\}.$$

Completeness

-  F. Veltman, D. de Jongh. *Provability Logics for Relative Interpretability*, Mathematical Logic, Springer, Boston, MA, 1990.
-  G. Japaridze, D. de Jongh. *The Logic of Provability*, Handbook of Proof Theory, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1998.

Theorem (Weak completeness)

If $\not\vdash_{\text{IL}} \varphi$, then there exists a finite Veltman model $\mathfrak{M}$ such that $\mathfrak{M} \not\models \varphi$.

Incompleteness of extensions

 E. Goris, J.J. Joosten. *A new principle in the interpretability logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories*, Logic Journal of the IGPL 19, 2011.

Completeness theorem, however, does not hold for extensions of **IL**. Consider systems **ILP**₀ and **ILR** obtained by adding one of the following to our system:

$$P_0 \quad (\varphi \triangleright \Diamond \psi) \rightarrow \Box(\varphi \triangleright \psi),$$

$$R \quad (\varphi \triangleright \psi) \rightarrow \neg(\varphi \triangleright \neg \chi) \triangleright (\psi \triangleright \Box \chi).$$

It can be shown that P_0 and R define the same class of frames, but $\not\models_{\mathbf{ILP}_0} R$, which means that system **ILP**₀ is incomplete with respect to Veltman semantics.

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Interpretability algebras

Definition

An *interpretability algebra* is a tuple $\mathfrak{A} = (A, +, -, 0, f_{\triangleright})$, where $(A, +, -, 0)$ is a boolean algebra and $f_{\triangleright} : A \times A \rightarrow A$ is an operator satisfying the following (where we use abbreviations $f_{\Box}(x) := f_{\triangleright}(-x, 0)$ and $f_{\Diamond}(x) := -f_{\Box}(-x)$):

- ① $f_{\Diamond}(0) = 0$,
- ② $f_{\Box}(-f_{\Box}(x) + x) = f_{\Box}(x)$,
- ③ $f_{\triangleright}(x, z) \cdot f_{\triangleright}(y, z) = f_{\triangleright}(x + y, z)$,
- ④ $-f_{\Box}(-x + y) + f_{\triangleright}(x, y) = 1$
- ⑤ $-f_{\triangleright}(x, y) + (-f_{\triangleright}(y, z)) + f_{\triangleright}(x, z) = 1$,
- ⑥ $-f_{\triangleright}(x, y) + f_{\Box}(-x) + f_{\Diamond}y = 1$,
- ⑦ $f_{\triangleright}(f_{\Diamond}(x), x) = 1$.

Algebras from frames

Let $\mathfrak{F} = (W, R, \{S_w : w \in W\})$ be a Veltman frame. Then the structure

$$\mathfrak{F}^+ := (\mathcal{P}(W), \cup, ^c, \emptyset, m_{\triangleright}),$$

where

$$m_{\triangleright}(X, Y) = \{w \in W : \forall u \in X (wRu \rightarrow \exists v \in Y (uS_w v))\},$$

is an interpretability algebra, which we refer to as the *complex interpretability algebra* of $\mathfrak{F}$. This means that interpretability algebras are a generalization of Veltman frames.

What about the interpretation of formulae?

Algebraic models

Definition

Let $\mathfrak{A} = (A, +, -, 0, f_{\triangleright})$ be an interpretability algebra. An *assignment* is a function $\theta : \text{Prop} \rightarrow A$.

We can extend an assignment function to the set of all formulae in the following way:

$$\begin{aligned}\theta(\perp) &= 0, \\ \theta(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) &= -\theta(\varphi) + \theta(\psi), \\ \theta(\varphi \triangleright \psi) &= f_{\triangleright}(\theta(\varphi), \theta(\psi)).\end{aligned}$$

When $\mathfrak{A}$ is a complex interpretability algebra of a frame, the assignment is nothing more than a valuation. Hence, interpretability algebras with assignments are a generalization of Veltman models.

Algebraic models

Definition

Let φ and ψ be some formulae. We refer to an expression of the form $\varphi \approx \psi$ as an **IL-equation**.

We say that an **IL-equation** $\varphi \approx \psi$ is *true* in an interpretability algebra $\mathfrak{A}$, which we denote as $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi \approx \psi$, if for every assignment θ we have $\theta(\varphi) = \theta(\psi)$.

For complex interpretability algebras, the following holds:

$$\begin{aligned}(\mathfrak{F}, \theta), w \Vdash \varphi & \text{ if and only if } w \in \theta(\varphi), \\ \mathfrak{F} \Vdash \varphi & \text{ if and only if } \mathfrak{F}^+ \models \varphi \approx \top, \\ \mathfrak{F} \Vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi & \text{ if and only if } \mathfrak{F}^+ \models \varphi \approx \psi.\end{aligned}$$

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Logic **IL**

Straightforward induction over the length of a derivation may be used to prove the soundness theorem, i.e.

Theorem (Soundness)

If φ is a theorem of **IL**, then $\varphi \approx \top$ is true on any interpretability algebra.

Additionally, we may use the completeness theorem for **IL** with respect to Veltman semantics to prove the completeness theorem, i.e.

Theorem (Completeness)

If for every interpretability algebra $\mathfrak{A}$ we have $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi \approx \top$, then $\vdash_{\mathbf{IL}} \varphi$.

Extensions of **IL**

If φ is a formula, we use $\varphi^\approx$ to denote the equation $\varphi \approx \top$.

Given a set of formulae Σ , we use V_Σ to denote the class of all interpretability algebras in which the set $\{\varphi^\approx : \varphi \in \Sigma\}$ is true.

For an extension **IL**⁺ of **IL**, we use $V_{\mathbf{IL}^+}$ to denote a class of interpretability algebras in which the set of all axioms of **IL**⁺ is true.

Extensions of **IL**

We define the relation $\equiv_{\mathbf{IL}^+}$ between formulae in $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{IL}}$ in the following way:

$$\varphi \equiv_{\mathbf{IL}^+} \psi \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \vdash_{\mathbf{IL}^+} \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi.$$

If $\varphi \equiv_{\mathbf{IL}^+} \psi$, we say that φ and ψ are equivalent *modulo* $\mathbf{IL}^+$.

Relation $\equiv_{\mathbf{IL}^+}$ is a congruence relation (an equivalence relation which is well behaved with respect to boolean connectives and operators).

Lindenbaum-Tarski $\mathbf{IL}^+$ -algebra

Definition

Let $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{IL}}$ be the set of all formulae in the language of $\mathbf{IL}$. The *Lindenbaum-Tarski $\mathbf{IL}^+$ -algebra* is the structure

$$\mathfrak{L}_{\mathbf{IL}^+} = (\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{IL}} / \equiv_{\mathbf{IL}^+}, +, -, 0, f_{\triangleright}),$$

where $[\varphi] + [\psi] := [\varphi \vee \psi]$, $-[\varphi] := [\neg\varphi]$, $0 := [\perp]$ and $f_{\triangleright}([\varphi], [\psi]) := [\varphi \triangleright \psi]$.

Lindenbaum-Tarski $\mathbf{IL}^+$ -algebra is an interpretability algebra which belongs to the class $V_{\mathbf{IL}^+}$. Additionally, for all formulae φ ,

$$\vdash_{\mathbf{IL}^+} \varphi \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \mathfrak{L}_{\mathbf{IL}^+} \models \varphi \approx \top.$$

Completeness

Lindenbaum-Tarski $\mathbf{IL}^+$ -algebra falsifies all non-theorems of $\mathbf{IL}^+$. Therefore, if we have a non-theorem of $\mathbf{IL}^+$, we have found an algebra belonging to the class $V_{\mathbf{IL}^+}$ which falsifies it. Hence, we have the following theorem:

Theorem (Completeness for extensions)

Let $\mathbf{IL}^+$ be an extension of $\mathbf{IL}$. Then $\mathbf{IL}^+$ is sound and complete with respect to $V_{\mathbf{IL}^+}$, i.e.,

$$\vdash_{\mathbf{IL}^+} \varphi \quad \text{if and only if} \quad V_{\mathbf{IL}^+} \models \varphi^{\approx}.$$

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Properties of interpretability algebras

- a boolean algebra together with an operator $f_{\triangleright}$, satisfying some conditions,
- every Veltman frame is an interpretability algebra,
- interpretability logic **IL** is sound and complete with respect to the class of all interpretability algebras,
- every extension of **IL** is sound and complete with respect to some class of interpretability algebras.

Concluding remarks

This result

- improves upon Veltman semantics, in a natural way analogous to modal logic,
- proves completeness of extensions in a modular way,
- generalizes the notion of BAO to interpretability logics.

Concluding remarks

Future work:

- general frame semantics,
- duality theory.

Concluding remarks

Thank you for your attention!

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